Fix some SRP issues
-> Remove memory allocation bugs -> Merge changes from upstream, enabling customizeable memory allocation
This commit is contained in:
est31
parent
2a7d01b833
commit
0bf1984d2c
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@ -1059,8 +1059,10 @@ void Client::startAuth(AuthMechanism chosen_auth_mechanism)
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m_password.length(), NULL, NULL);
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char *bytes_A = 0;
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size_t len_A = 0;
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srp_user_start_authentication((struct SRPUser *) m_auth_data,
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NULL, NULL, 0, (unsigned char **) &bytes_A, &len_A);
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SRP_Result res = srp_user_start_authentication(
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(struct SRPUser *) m_auth_data, NULL, NULL, 0,
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(unsigned char **) &bytes_A, &len_A);
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FATAL_ERROR_IF(res != SRP_OK, "Creating local SRP user failed.");
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NetworkPacket resp_pkt(TOSERVER_SRP_BYTES_A, 0);
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resp_pkt << std::string(bytes_A, len_A) << based_on;
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@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
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#include "sha1.h"
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#include "srp.h"
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#include "string.h"
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#include "debug.h"
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// Get an sha-1 hash of the player's name combined with
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// the password entered. That's what the server uses as
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@ -50,10 +51,11 @@ void getSRPVerifier(const std::string &name,
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char **bytes_v, size_t *len_v)
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{
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std::string n_name = lowercase(name);
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srp_create_salted_verification_key(SRP_SHA256, SRP_NG_2048,
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SRP_Result res = srp_create_salted_verification_key(SRP_SHA256, SRP_NG_2048,
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n_name.c_str(), (const unsigned char *)password.c_str(),
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password.size(), (unsigned char **)salt, salt_len,
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(unsigned char **)bytes_v, len_v, NULL, NULL);
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FATAL_ERROR_IF(res != SRP_OK, "Couldn't create salted SRP verifier");
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}
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// Get a db-ready SRP verifier
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@ -67,6 +69,7 @@ inline static std::string getSRPVerifier(const std::string &name,
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size_t len_v;
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getSRPVerifier(name, password, salt, &salt_len,
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&bytes_v, &len_v);
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assert(*salt); // usually, srp_create_salted_verification_key promises us to return SRP_ERR when *salt == NULL
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std::string ret_val = encodeSRPVerifier(std::string(bytes_v, len_v),
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std::string(*salt, salt_len));
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free(bytes_v);
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193
src/util/srp.cpp
193
src/util/srp.cpp
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@ -69,6 +69,19 @@ static int g_initialized = 0;
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static unsigned int g_rand_idx;
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static unsigned char g_rand_buff[RAND_BUFF_MAX];
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void *(*srp_alloc) (size_t) = &malloc;
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void *(*srp_realloc) (void *, size_t) = &realloc;
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void (*srp_free) (void *) = &free;
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void srp_set_memory_functions(
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void *(*new_srp_alloc) (size_t),
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void *(*new_srp_realloc) (void *, size_t),
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void (*new_srp_free) (void *)) {
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srp_alloc = new_srp_alloc;
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srp_realloc = new_srp_realloc;
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srp_free = new_srp_free;
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}
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typedef struct
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{
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mpz_t N;
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@ -171,13 +184,13 @@ static void delete_ng(NGConstant *ng)
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if (ng) {
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mpz_clear(ng->N);
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mpz_clear(ng->g);
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free(ng);
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srp_free(ng);
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}
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}
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static NGConstant *new_ng( SRP_NGType ng_type, const char *n_hex, const char *g_hex )
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{
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NGConstant *ng = (NGConstant *) malloc(sizeof(NGConstant));
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NGConstant *ng = (NGConstant *) srp_alloc(sizeof(NGConstant));
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mpz_init(ng->N);
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mpz_init(ng->g);
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@ -367,18 +380,18 @@ static int H_nn(mpz_t result, SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const mpz_t N, const mpz_t
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size_t len_n1 = mpz_num_bytes(n1);
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size_t len_n2 = mpz_num_bytes(n2);
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size_t nbytes = len_N + len_N;
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unsigned char *bin = (unsigned char *) malloc(nbytes);
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unsigned char *bin = (unsigned char *) srp_alloc(nbytes);
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if (!bin)
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return 0;
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if (len_n1 > len_N || len_n2 > len_N) {
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free(bin);
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srp_free(bin);
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return 0;
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}
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memset(bin, 0, nbytes);
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mpz_to_bin(n1, bin + (len_N - len_n1));
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mpz_to_bin(n2, bin + (len_N + len_N - len_n2));
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hash( alg, bin, nbytes, buff );
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free(bin);
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srp_free(bin);
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mpz_from_bin(buff, hash_length(alg), result);
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return 1;
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}
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@ -387,13 +400,13 @@ static int H_ns(mpz_t result, SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const unsigned char *n, siz
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{
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unsigned char buff[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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size_t nbytes = len_n + len_bytes;
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unsigned char *bin = (unsigned char *) malloc(nbytes);
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unsigned char *bin = (unsigned char *) srp_alloc(nbytes);
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if (!bin)
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return 0;
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memcpy(bin, n, len_n);
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memcpy(bin + len_n, bytes, len_bytes);
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hash(alg, bin, nbytes, buff);
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free(bin);
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srp_free(bin);
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mpz_from_bin(buff, hash_length(alg), result);
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return 1;
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}
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@ -418,23 +431,23 @@ static int calculate_x(mpz_t result, SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const unsigned char
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static void update_hash_n(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, HashCTX *ctx, const mpz_t n)
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{
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size_t len = mpz_num_bytes(n);
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unsigned char* n_bytes = (unsigned char *) malloc(len);
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unsigned char* n_bytes = (unsigned char *) srp_alloc(len);
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if (!n_bytes)
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return;
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mpz_to_bin(n, n_bytes);
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hash_update(alg, ctx, n_bytes, len);
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free(n_bytes);
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srp_free(n_bytes);
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}
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static void hash_num( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, const mpz_t n, unsigned char *dest )
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{
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int nbytes = mpz_num_bytes(n);
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unsigned char *bin = (unsigned char *) malloc(nbytes);
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unsigned char *bin = (unsigned char *) srp_alloc(nbytes);
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if(!bin)
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return;
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mpz_to_bin(n, bin);
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hash(alg, bin, nbytes, dest);
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free(bin);
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srp_free(bin);
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}
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static void calculate_M(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, NGConstant *ng, unsigned char *dest,
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@ -510,7 +523,7 @@ static void srp_pcgrandom_seed(srp_pcgrandom *r, unsigned long long int state,
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}
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static int fill_buff()
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static SRP_Result fill_buff()
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{
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g_rand_idx = 0;
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@ -526,7 +539,7 @@ static int fill_buff()
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CryptGenRandom(wctx, sizeof(g_rand_buff), (BYTE*) g_rand_buff);
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CryptReleaseContext(wctx, 0);
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return 1;
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return SRP_OK;
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#else
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fp = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r");
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@ -535,41 +548,48 @@ static int fill_buff()
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fread(g_rand_buff, sizeof(g_rand_buff), 1, fp);
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fclose(fp);
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} else {
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srp_pcgrandom *r = (srp_pcgrandom *) malloc(sizeof(srp_pcgrandom));
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srp_pcgrandom *r = (srp_pcgrandom *) srp_alloc(sizeof(srp_pcgrandom));
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if (!r)
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return SRP_ERR;
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srp_pcgrandom_seed(r, time(NULL) ^ clock(), 0xda3e39cb94b95bdbULL);
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size_t i = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < RAND_BUFF_MAX; i++) {
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g_rand_buff[i] = srp_pcgrandom_next(r);
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}
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srp_free(r);
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}
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#endif
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return 1;
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return SRP_OK;
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}
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static void mpz_fill_random(mpz_t num)
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static SRP_Result mpz_fill_random(mpz_t num)
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{
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// was call: BN_rand(num, 256, -1, 0);
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if (RAND_BUFF_MAX - g_rand_idx < 32)
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fill_buff();
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if (fill_buff() != SRP_OK)
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return SRP_ERR;
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mpz_from_bin((const unsigned char *) (&g_rand_buff[g_rand_idx]), 32, num);
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g_rand_idx += 32;
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return SRP_OK;
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}
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static void init_random()
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static SRP_Result init_random()
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{
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if (g_initialized)
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return;
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g_initialized = fill_buff();
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return SRP_OK;
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SRP_Result ret = fill_buff();
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g_initialized = (ret == SRP_OK);
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return ret;
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}
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#define srp_dbg_num(num, text) ;
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/*void srp_dbg_num(mpz_t num, char * prevtext)
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{
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int len_num = mpz_num_bytes(num);
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char *bytes_num = (char*) malloc(len_num);
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char *bytes_num = (char*) srp_alloc(len_num);
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mpz_to_bin(num, (unsigned char *) bytes_num);
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srp_dbg_data(bytes_num, len_num, prevtext);
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free(bytes_num);
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srp_free(bytes_num);
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}*/
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@ -579,35 +599,42 @@ static void init_random()
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*
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***********************************************************************************************************/
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void srp_create_salted_verification_key( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
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SRP_Result srp_create_salted_verification_key( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
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SRP_NGType ng_type, const char *username_for_verifier,
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const unsigned char *password, size_t len_password,
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unsigned char **bytes_s, size_t *len_s,
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unsigned char **bytes_v, size_t *len_v,
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const char *n_hex, const char *g_hex )
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{
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SRP_Result ret = SRP_OK;
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mpz_t v; mpz_init(v);
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mpz_t x; mpz_init(x);
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NGConstant *ng = new_ng(ng_type, n_hex, g_hex);
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if(!ng)
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goto cleanup_and_exit;
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if (!ng)
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goto error_and_exit;
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init_random(); /* Only happens once */
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if (init_random() != SRP_OK) /* Only happens once */
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goto error_and_exit;
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if (*bytes_s == NULL) {
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*len_s = 16;
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if (RAND_BUFF_MAX - g_rand_idx < 16)
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fill_buff();
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*bytes_s = (unsigned char*)malloc(sizeof(char) * 16);
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memcpy(*bytes_s, &g_rand_buff + g_rand_idx, sizeof(char) * 16);
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g_rand_idx += 16;
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size_t size_to_fill = 16;
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*len_s = size_to_fill;
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if (RAND_BUFF_MAX - g_rand_idx < size_to_fill)
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if (fill_buff() != SRP_OK)
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goto error_and_exit;
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*bytes_s = (unsigned char*)srp_alloc(size_to_fill);
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if (!*bytes_s)
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goto error_and_exit;
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memcpy(*bytes_s, &g_rand_buff + g_rand_idx, size_to_fill);
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g_rand_idx += size_to_fill;
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}
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if (!calculate_x(x, alg, *bytes_s, *len_s, username_for_verifier,
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password, len_password))
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goto cleanup_and_exit;
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goto error_and_exit;
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srp_dbg_num(x, "Server calculated x: ");
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@ -615,10 +642,10 @@ void srp_create_salted_verification_key( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
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*len_v = mpz_num_bytes(v);
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*bytes_v = (unsigned char*)malloc(*len_v);
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*bytes_v = (unsigned char*)srp_alloc(*len_v);
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if (!bytes_v)
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goto cleanup_and_exit;
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goto error_and_exit;
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mpz_to_bin(v, *bytes_v);
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@ -626,6 +653,10 @@ cleanup_and_exit:
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delete_ng( ng );
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mpz_clear(v);
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mpz_clear(x);
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return ret;
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error_and_exit:
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ret = SRP_ERR;
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goto cleanup_and_exit;
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}
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@ -663,19 +694,23 @@ struct SRPVerifier *srp_verifier_new(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
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if (!ng)
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goto cleanup_and_exit;
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ver = (struct SRPVerifier *) malloc( sizeof(struct SRPVerifier) );
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ver = (struct SRPVerifier *) srp_alloc( sizeof(struct SRPVerifier) );
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if (!ver)
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goto cleanup_and_exit;
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init_random(); /* Only happens once */
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if (init_random() != SRP_OK) { /* Only happens once */
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srp_free(ver);
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ver = 0;
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goto cleanup_and_exit;
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}
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ver->username = (char *) malloc(ulen);
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ver->username = (char *) srp_alloc(ulen);
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ver->hash_alg = alg;
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ver->ng = ng;
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if (!ver->username) {
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free(ver);
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srp_free(ver);
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ver = 0;
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goto cleanup_and_exit;
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}
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@ -690,11 +725,15 @@ struct SRPVerifier *srp_verifier_new(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
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if (bytes_b) {
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mpz_from_bin(bytes_b, len_b, b);
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} else {
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mpz_fill_random(b);
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if (mpz_fill_random(b) != SRP_OK) {
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srp_free(ver);
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ver = 0;
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goto cleanup_and_exit;
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}
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}
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if (!H_nn(k, alg, ng->N, ng->N, ng->g)) {
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free(ver);
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srp_free(ver);
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ver = 0;
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goto cleanup_and_exit;
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}
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@ -705,7 +744,7 @@ struct SRPVerifier *srp_verifier_new(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
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mpz_addm(B, tmp1, tmp2, ng->N, tmp3);
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if (!H_nn(u, alg, ng->N, A, B)) {
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free(ver);
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srp_free(ver);
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ver = 0;
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goto cleanup_and_exit;
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}
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@ -723,11 +762,11 @@ struct SRPVerifier *srp_verifier_new(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
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calculate_H_AMK(alg, ver->H_AMK, A, ver->M, ver->session_key);
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*len_B = mpz_num_bytes(B);
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*bytes_B = (unsigned char*)malloc(*len_B);
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*bytes_B = (unsigned char*)srp_alloc(*len_B);
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if (!*bytes_B) {
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free(ver->username);
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free(ver);
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srp_free(ver->username);
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srp_free(ver);
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ver = 0;
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*len_B = 0;
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goto cleanup_and_exit;
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@ -737,7 +776,7 @@ struct SRPVerifier *srp_verifier_new(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
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ver->bytes_B = *bytes_B;
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} else {
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free(ver);
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srp_free(ver);
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ver = 0;
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}
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@ -762,10 +801,10 @@ void srp_verifier_delete(struct SRPVerifier *ver)
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{
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if (ver) {
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delete_ng(ver->ng);
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free(ver->username);
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free(ver->bytes_B);
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srp_free(ver->username);
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srp_free(ver->bytes_B);
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memset(ver, 0, sizeof(*ver));
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free(ver);
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srp_free(ver);
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}
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}
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@ -814,14 +853,15 @@ struct SRPUser *srp_user_new(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type,
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const unsigned char *bytes_password, size_t len_password,
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const char *n_hex, const char *g_hex)
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{
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struct SRPUser *usr = (struct SRPUser *) malloc(sizeof(struct SRPUser));
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struct SRPUser *usr = (struct SRPUser *) srp_alloc(sizeof(struct SRPUser));
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size_t ulen = strlen(username) + 1;
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size_t uvlen = strlen(username_for_verifier) + 1;
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if (!usr)
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goto err_exit;
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init_random(); /* Only happens once */
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if (init_random() != SRP_OK) /* Only happens once */
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goto err_exit;
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usr->hash_alg = alg;
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usr->ng = new_ng(ng_type, n_hex, g_hex);
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@ -833,12 +873,12 @@ struct SRPUser *srp_user_new(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type,
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if (!usr->ng)
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goto err_exit;
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usr->username = (char*)malloc(ulen);
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usr->username_verifier = (char*)malloc(uvlen);
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usr->password = (unsigned char*)malloc(len_password);
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usr->username = (char*)srp_alloc(ulen);
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usr->username_verifier = (char*)srp_alloc(uvlen);
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usr->password = (unsigned char*)srp_alloc(len_password);
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usr->password_len = len_password;
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|
||||
if (!usr->username || !usr->password)
|
||||
if (!usr->username || !usr->password || !usr->username_verifier)
|
||||
goto err_exit;
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(usr->username, username, ulen);
|
||||
|
|
@ -858,15 +898,13 @@ err_exit:
|
|||
mpz_clear(usr->S);
|
||||
if (usr->ng)
|
||||
delete_ng(usr->ng);
|
||||
if (usr->username)
|
||||
free(usr->username);
|
||||
if (usr->username_verifier)
|
||||
free(usr->username_verifier);
|
||||
srp_free(usr->username);
|
||||
srp_free(usr->username_verifier);
|
||||
if (usr->password) {
|
||||
memset(usr->password, 0, usr->password_len);
|
||||
free(usr->password);
|
||||
srp_free(usr->password);
|
||||
}
|
||||
free(usr);
|
||||
srp_free(usr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
|
@ -885,15 +923,15 @@ void srp_user_delete(struct SRPUser *usr)
|
|||
|
||||
memset(usr->password, 0, usr->password_len);
|
||||
|
||||
free(usr->username);
|
||||
free(usr->username_verifier);
|
||||
free(usr->password);
|
||||
srp_free(usr->username);
|
||||
srp_free(usr->username_verifier);
|
||||
srp_free(usr->password);
|
||||
|
||||
if (usr->bytes_A)
|
||||
free(usr->bytes_A);
|
||||
srp_free(usr->bytes_A);
|
||||
|
||||
memset(usr, 0, sizeof(*usr));
|
||||
free(usr);
|
||||
srp_free(usr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -926,33 +964,38 @@ size_t srp_user_get_session_key_length(struct SRPUser *usr)
|
|||
|
||||
|
||||
/* Output: username, bytes_A, len_A */
|
||||
void srp_user_start_authentication(struct SRPUser *usr, char **username,
|
||||
SRP_Result srp_user_start_authentication(struct SRPUser *usr, char **username,
|
||||
const unsigned char *bytes_a, size_t len_a,
|
||||
unsigned char **bytes_A, size_t *len_A)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (bytes_a) {
|
||||
mpz_from_bin(bytes_a, len_a, usr->a);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
mpz_fill_random(usr->a);
|
||||
if (mpz_fill_random(usr->a) != SRP_OK)
|
||||
goto error_and_exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
mpz_powm(usr->A, usr->ng->g, usr->a, usr->ng->N);
|
||||
|
||||
*len_A = mpz_num_bytes(usr->A);
|
||||
*bytes_A = (unsigned char*)malloc(*len_A);
|
||||
*bytes_A = (unsigned char*)srp_alloc(*len_A);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!*bytes_A) {
|
||||
*len_A = 0;
|
||||
*bytes_A = 0;
|
||||
*username = 0;
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!*bytes_A)
|
||||
goto error_and_exit;
|
||||
|
||||
mpz_to_bin(usr->A, *bytes_A);
|
||||
|
||||
usr->bytes_A = *bytes_A;
|
||||
if (username)
|
||||
*username = usr->username;
|
||||
|
||||
return SRP_OK;
|
||||
|
||||
error_and_exit:
|
||||
*len_A = 0;
|
||||
*bytes_A = 0;
|
||||
*username = 0;
|
||||
return SRP_ERR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -78,6 +78,22 @@ typedef enum
|
|||
SRP_SHA512*/
|
||||
} SRP_HashAlgorithm;
|
||||
|
||||
typedef enum
|
||||
{
|
||||
SRP_OK,
|
||||
SRP_ERR,
|
||||
} SRP_Result;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Sets the memory functions used by srp.
|
||||
* Note: this doesn't set the memory functions used by gmp,
|
||||
* but it is supported to have different functions for srp and gmp.
|
||||
* Don't call this after you have already allocated srp structures.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void srp_set_memory_functions(
|
||||
void *(*new_srp_alloc) (size_t),
|
||||
void *(*new_srp_realloc) (void *, size_t),
|
||||
void (*new_srp_free) (void *));
|
||||
|
||||
/* Out: bytes_v, len_v
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The caller is responsible for freeing the memory allocated for bytes_v
|
||||
|
|
@ -86,8 +102,11 @@ typedef enum
|
|||
* If provided, they must contain ASCII text of the hexidecimal notation.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If bytes_s == NULL, it is filled with random data. The caller is responsible for freeing.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Returns SRP_OK on success, and SRP_ERR on error.
|
||||
* bytes_s might be in this case invalid, don't free it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void srp_create_salted_verification_key( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
|
||||
SRP_Result srp_create_salted_verification_key( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
|
||||
SRP_NGType ng_type, const char *username_for_verifier,
|
||||
const unsigned char *password, size_t len_password,
|
||||
unsigned char **bytes_s, size_t *len_s,
|
||||
|
|
@ -101,6 +120,8 @@ void srp_create_salted_verification_key( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
|
|||
* The n_hex and g_hex parameters should be 0 unless SRP_NG_CUSTOM is used for ng_type
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If bytes_b == NULL, random data is used for b.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Returns pointer to SRPVerifier on success, and NULL on error.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
struct SRPVerifier* srp_verifier_new(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type,
|
||||
const char *username,
|
||||
|
|
@ -114,7 +135,7 @@ struct SRPVerifier* srp_verifier_new(SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type,
|
|||
|
||||
void srp_verifier_delete( struct SRPVerifier* ver );
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
// srp_verifier_verify_session must have been called before
|
||||
int srp_verifier_is_authenticated( struct SRPVerifier* ver );
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -128,7 +149,9 @@ const unsigned char* srp_verifier_get_session_key( struct SRPVerifier* ver,
|
|||
size_t srp_verifier_get_session_key_length(struct SRPVerifier* ver);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* user_M must be exactly srp_verifier_get_session_key_length() bytes in size */
|
||||
/* Verifies session, on success, it writes bytes_HAMK.
|
||||
* user_M must be exactly srp_verifier_get_session_key_length() bytes in size
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void srp_verifier_verify_session( struct SRPVerifier* ver,
|
||||
const unsigned char* user_M, unsigned char** bytes_HAMK );
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -154,7 +177,7 @@ size_t srp_user_get_session_key_length(struct SRPUser* usr);
|
|||
|
||||
/* Output: username, bytes_A, len_A. If you don't want it get written, set username to NULL.
|
||||
* If bytes_a == NULL, random data is used for a. */
|
||||
void srp_user_start_authentication(struct SRPUser* usr, char** username,
|
||||
SRP_Result srp_user_start_authentication(struct SRPUser* usr, char** username,
|
||||
const unsigned char* bytes_a, size_t len_a,
|
||||
unsigned char** bytes_A, size_t* len_A);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue